Fordham Law Review
Manuscript 5926

A Commons in the Master’s House
Daniel Farbman

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons

A COMMONS IN THE MASTER’S HOUSE
Daniel Farbman*
Almost everyone who reads these words is an institutional insider in some
form. Those of us who aspire toward transformation, liberation, and
resistance from our institutional settings are forced to confront Audre
Lorde’s striking admonition that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the
master’s house.” For some, finding themselves in the master’s house is a
spur towards purism—a rejection of institutional power in search of a
“pure” remove from which to critique it. For others, it is a dispiriting check
on their aspirations and an invitation to sullen fatalism. This Essay questions
whether we are bound to the hard consequences of purism or whether there
are avenues within our institutional infrastructure that allow us to pursue
change with radical pragmatism.
Canvassing my own historical work on the struggle against slavery in the
1850s, I advance the beginning of an answer: it may be that it is impossible
to revolutionize the institutions we work in as insiders, but it is possible for
institutional actors to hold deliberative space within their institutions for
transformational and radical imagination. By deliberative space, I mean
space held open for conversation, democracy, and participatory
deliberation. None of us, alone, can imagine our way out of the master’s
house. But together, by stepping back and making space, we may be able to
open a commons in the master’s house where we listen, dream, and challenge
each other.
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I. IMAGINING THE COMMONS
A. Compromise and Complicity
In the late summer of 1853, white abolitionists in Cincinnati had a tragic
fight about how far to take political purity. In August 1853, a federal marshal
arrested George “Wash” McQuerry in Ohio.1 A Kentuckian named Henry
Miller claimed that McQuerry was his property and sought to use the
mechanics of the Fugitive Slave Act of 18502 to re-enslave McQuerry and
bring him back to Kentucky.3 As soon as McQuerry was arrested, the
antislavery activist network in Cincinnati went into high alert.4 They knew
that if Miller could hurry McQuerry into a courtroom without anyone being
the wiser, the quick and egregious legal processes afforded to putative
owners would allow Miller to be across the river to enslave McQuerry before
anyone had even known he had been captured.5 So as soon as the arrest took
place, one of the most prominent Black abolitionists in the city, Peter Clark,
ran through the streets to share the news with the city’s leading abolitionist
lawyer, John Jolliffe.6 Clark and Jolliffe huddled in Jolliffe’s office drafting
a writ of habeas corpus.7 Then, at two o’clock in the morning, Clark drove

1. See Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 335–36 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583).
2. Ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
3. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. at 336. Undisputedly, McQuerry had indeed been enslaved in
Kentucky before he escaped to Ohio in the 1840s. See Arrest of a Fugitive—Much Excitement,
DAILY HERALD (Cleveland), Aug. 19, 1853. Once McQuerry had settled on a farm in southern
Ohio, he got married and had three children. See id. He was respected in the community and
known as a “sober, hard working man.” Id.
4. See Arrest of a Fugitive—Much Excitement, supra note 3 (noting that McQuerry had
to be guarded by a “posse of police” against “a crowd of 200 negroes”).
5. See Daniel Farbman, Resistance Lawyering, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1894 (2019)
(describing the legal system’s re-enslavement processes).
6. See NIKKI M. TAYLOR, AMERICA’S FIRST BLACK SOCIALIST: THE RADICAL LIFE OF
PETER H. CLARK 92 (2013).
7. See id.
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to the town of Clifton where he delivered the writ to U.S. Supreme Court
Justice John McLean at his home there.8
The mad dash had its intended effect: instead of McQuerry being silently
re-enslaved, his trial became a public spectacle that drew national attention.9
Jolliffe used the trial to spotlight the evils of slavery and to build public
support for McQuerry (and antipathy toward Miller).10 During the trial,
Cincinnati’s antislavery forces were united in support of McQuerry.
Hundreds of people took to the streets in support of his freedom, and the
antislavery activists used the press and the public square to condemn the
institution and men like Miller (and then McLean) who upheld it.11
But when the trial ended with the tragic conclusion that McQuerry was to
be re-enslaved, a fight broke out among the abolitionists over what measures
they should take to free him. Under public pressure, Miller had promised to
sell McQuerry into freedom if his supporters could raise $1,200.12 Some
abolitionist leaders in the city organized an effort to capitalize on public
outrage and raise the money to free McQuerry.13 Others opposed this effort
on the grounds that participating in the monstrous economy of slavery was a

8. See id.
9. The trial reached the attention of William Lloyd Garrison, the editor of the leading
abolitionist newspaper in the nation, The Liberator. The Liberator reported that the trial was
a spectacle: “The jury box was filled by ladies, so crowded was the court room.” Accursed
Be the Union!, LIBERATOR, Aug. 26, 1853, at 135.
10. See generally LEVI COFFIN, REMINISCENCES OF LEVI COFFIN, THE REPUTED PRESIDENT
OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 545–46 (Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 2d ed., 1880).
Jolliffe pilloried Miller and Kentucky for
demanding a process by which this defendant—this intelligent and upright human
being—may be dragged from his home, from the wife of his bosom, from the graves
of his children, and, bound hand and foot, hurried forever away from them and from
all he holds dear, . . . [so that] the last drop of his blood may be scourged out on far
Southern plantations.
Id.
11. See generally Accursed Be the Union!, supra note 9.
12. Miller “generously” offered to contribute $50, making the actual price $1,150. C OFFIN,
supra note 10, at 547.
13. See id. at 547–48.
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ratification of the institution.14 The disagreement was such that, despite their
best efforts, the collection fell short.15
The proximate result of this intramovement disagreement was a human
tragedy. Wash McQuerry was enslaved, torn from his family and life, and
relegated to the status of property.16 From our perspective today, this looks
like an avoidable tragedy—a catastrophic consequence of short-sighted
purity politics in the face of a moral cataclysm. It seems that a group of white
abolitionists cared more about their own moral consistency than they did
about McQuerry’s life. But this tidy presentist moral calculus makes matters
too easy. In the brutal reality of slavery, McQuerry’s tragedy was just one
among thousands of moral horrors occurring every day. To radical purists,
any compromise or complicity with slavery was an endorsement and
perpetuation of the system itself, and such an endorsement was too steep a
price to pay to save McQuerry. The radical pragmatists who sought to
purchase McQuerry’s freedom had to make peace with the fact that they were
willing to participate within a system of property and capitalism that was
murderous, oppressive, and fundamentally horrific.17
Anyone familiar with the internal strategic conflicts in contemporary
social movements18 should be cautious about judging too harshly the

14. Levi Coffin was a Quaker who ran a store that sold goods untainted by the slave
economy. See NIKKI M. TAYLOR, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM: CINCINNATI’S BLACK COMMUNITY,
1802–1868, at 152 (2005). He was also one of the most active leaders of the Underground
Railroad in Cincinnati. See id. Somewhat ironically, given Coffin’s commitment to purity as
a matter of commerce, it was he who “made zealous efforts to raise the sum” to purchase
McQuerry’s freedom. COFFIN, supra note 10, at 547. On the other side of the debate was Dr.
William Henry Brisbane, a former slave owner who had moved north from South Carolina
and converted to a rigid and radical abolitionist. See 1 MARY ELLEN SNODGRASS, THE
UNDERGROUND RAILROAD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEOPLE, PLACES, AND OPERATIONS 73
(2008). Brisbane was among a group of opponents of slavery who did not support paying
slave owners because it suggested that their claims to “property” were legitimate. See Journal
of William Henry Brisbane (Aug. 19, 1853) (on file with author) (“To night I attended a
meeting at the Zion’s Church held to raise money to purchase the freedom of McQuerry. Not
approving the measure I took no part in the meeting.”); see also Farbman, supra note 5, at
1912.
15. See COFFIN, supra note 10, at 547–48.
16. See generally id.
17. See Farbman, supra note 5, at 1912. In fact, disputes over whether and how to
purchase a slave’s freedom (or “redeem” it) were frequent and ethically complex. For a fuller
accounting of the economics and morality of this problem, see B UYING FREEDOM: THE ETHICS
AND ECONOMICS OF SLAVE REDEMPTION (Kwame Anthony Appiah & Martin Bunzl eds.,
2007).
18. While I intend my use of “movement” and “social movement” to be capacious enough
to admit multiple definitions, it may be useful to lay out how I understand the term in my own
scholarship. My own definition follows that of Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres (who in turn
built on the work of many others, including Stanley Tarrow). In their words, “[s]ocial
movements arise when ordinary people join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities,
and opponents to change the exercise and distribution of power.” Lani Guinier & Gerald
Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements,
123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2757 (2014). To this definition I would add my own gloss from prior
work: “The movements that I am focused on are demanding fundamental institutional
alterations in the legal order. They are movements that challenge the institutions themselves.”

2022]

A COMMONS IN THE MASTER’S HOUSE

2065

Cincinnati abolitionists who failed to free McQuerry. Questions of purity
and pragmatism battle at the heart of most movement strategies.19 In our
fallen world, situated as we are within overlapping imperfect (and often
overtly oppressive) systems, those of us who seek to change or overhaul those
systems often face the question of how to situate our struggles within and
against these systems. Should we reject the systems altogether? Should we
participate in them in good faith? Should we participate in them with the
goal of undermining them? How do we balance pragmatism and strategy
against purism and moral clarity?
B. The Master’s House
Nobody can pass through any sort of self-reflective activist space without
encountering Audre Lorde’s arresting proclamation that “the master’s tools
will never dismantle the master’s house.”20 Lorde’s words stand in for a
broader set of arguments aimed at any number of problematic institutions.
From debates over whether it is possible to be a “progressive prosecutor,”21
to debates over whether it is possible to be a transformative member of
Congress,22 to debates over whether it is possible to be a radical
corporation,23 the question of whether it is possible to transform the world
using existing systemic tools is one that haunts nearly every institution in our
lives.
For lawyers—and especially those of us who work in and around legal
education—the question has specific and familiar contours. We know that

Daniel Farbman, Judicial Solidarity?, 33 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 9) (on file with author).
19. To offer just one representative example, there has long been a similar conversation
taking place among activists fighting against cash bail. Some movement actors have
championed bail funds (which provide funding for detained people to post bail) as a means of
acting pragmatically within the system to resist the system. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail
Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 635–37 (2017). Others have argued that these bail funds
legitimize the system by participating in the immoral structure of cash bail. See id.
20. AUDRE LORDE, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110, 112 (1984).
21. See Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1415,
1415–19 (2021); see also Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L.
REV. 748 (2018).
22. While it is true that the group of young, progressive congresspeople who have been
labeled “The Squad,” pose a challenge to the mainstream Democratic Party, there is no doubt
that they are also committed and strategic institutional actors. See Aída Chávez, Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez Looks Like a Radical. She’s Really a Pragmatist., WASH. POST (Mar. 12,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/03/12/alexandria-ocasio-cortezpragmatist/ [https://perma.cc/9NHV-U876].
23. While a subset of for-profit corporations have become certified as “B-Corps” for their
commitment to balancing profit with doing good in the world, some argue that these labels,
however well-intentioned, do little to change the basic underlying structures of inequality and
subordination that sustain them. See, e.g., ANAND GIRIHARADAS, WINNERS TAKE ALL: THE
ELITE CHARADE OF CHANGING THE WORLD 212–14 (2019).
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law schools are haunted by big problems: hierarchy,24 cartelism,25 debt,26
and gender and race inequalities.27 If we are employed by law schools, we
know that we are party to these problems and inevitably complicit in
uncomfortable ways.28 These discomforts demand our own reckoning with
Lorde’s challenge. We who live and work in the master’s house—should we
be inside this house? And if so, what should we be doing here?29
C. A Place for Radical Imagination
It should be clear that I do not have a detached or dispassionate view of
this problem. I spent my years in practice before returning to the academy
working with grassroots organizers on long-term projects aimed at radically
transforming oppressive systems.30 When I left practice and entered the legal
24. For the last two years, I have taught Duncan Kennedy’s polemic, Legal Education and
the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982), and despite its age, my students
have uniformly identified with Kennedy’s core observation that law schools create, reproduce,
and organize themselves through hierarchical logics, see id. at 591–92.
25. The recent movement to abolish the bar exam has invigorated arguments that law
schools are part of a “legal cartel” that limits entry into the profession through controlled
chokepoints that do little to ensure qualifications and much to limit access. See Brian L. Frye,
It’s Time for Universal Diploma Privilege, JURIST (Apr. 6, 2020, 10:03 AM),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/04/brian-frye-diploma-privilege/
[https://perma.cc/T5MB-5RCQ] (“While I teach professional responsibility, the real title of
the class is ‘managing the legal cartel.’”); Jessica Williams, Abolish the Bar Exam, CALIF. L.
REV. BLOG (Oct. 2020), https://www.californialawreview.org/abolish-the-bar-exam/
[https://perma.cc/NN5H-PE2M] (“The bar exam is [a] system of oppression, as it was
designed to keep ‘undesirable’ (read: non-White, non-male) lawyers out of the profession.”).
26. A recent American Bar Association report found that recent law school graduates held
an average of $108,000 in debt. See Alexis Gravely, Impact of Student Debt on Young
Lawyers, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/09/
23/aba-report-shows-impact-law-school-debt-young-lawyers [https://perma.cc/H395-6P9E].
For Black law students, the number was over $200,000. See id. About 80 percent of these
students reported that their debt burden had an impact on the choices that they made about
their careers. See id.
27. See generally Bennett Capers, The Law School as a White Space, 106 MINN. L. REV.
7 (2021).
28. Perhaps the most searing statement of the problems in legal education comes from a
letter that Dean Spade wrote in 2010 addressed to “Those Considering Law School.” Letter
from Dean Spade for Those Considering Law School (Oct. 2010), http://www.deanspade.net/
wp-content/uploads/2010/10/For-Those-Considering-Law-School.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
YQ4T-93W4]. Spade’s letter argues that legal work is inherently supportive of existing
systems and that law school discourages radical imagination. See id. It is aimed at idealistic
young people considering law school, but also serves as an indictment of the entire system of
legal education and legal practice as unsuited to radical transformative work. See id.
29. In the essay where Lorde speaks these words, she is reflecting on the labor of women,
and especially non-white women in academic spaces. See generally LORDE, supra note 20.
More specifically, she is speaking these words at an academic conference to critique the
conference’s troubling complicity with academic hierarchy and erasure of marginalized
voices. See id. at 110. From the conference itself, Lorde is challenging her listeners to do
better, to seek other modes of solidarity and interaction, and to question their core institutional
commitments. See id. at 112–13. In this sense, Lorde offers her own specific response to what
academics should be doing with our power.
30. My work was primarily focused on equality in education and school discipline,
particularly what is sometimes called the school-to-prison pipeline. The communities and
organizers that I was working with imagined public school systems where funding was equal
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academy, I found myself haunted by the question of whether I had left a job
where I was “fighting the good fight” to join an institution where there was
no room for transformational work. I wondered, in short, whether I had
moved into the master’s house and picked up his tools.
On the other side of this anxiety was my realization (accepted after hard
reflection) that the work I wanted to do was not located on the front lines of
the “good fight,” but rather in libraries, in classrooms, and at the keyboard.
I had to come to terms with the fact that the work that lit me up was situated
(at least according to our current societal order) within the institution of the
legal academy.
Having reached this conclusion, the next question was whether it was an
impasse. Was compromise the same as concession? Was there room within
my work for radical and transformative imagination—even if that
imagination targeted the very institutions that I was working within?31
Most academics realize that our research and writing is motivated by
autobiographical curiosity or anxiety. (At least, I know this to be true of
myself.) This is why this story of my own institutional situation and anxiety
helps to explain the historical research and writing that I have been doing
since I joined the academy. In every project that I have undertaken, I have
asked a version of the same question: is there space within settled and often
oppressive institutions for utopian and radical imaginations that challenge
those institutions?32 Upon reflection, I realize that this question is a relative
of the question that the Cincinnati abolitionists faced over whether they
should purchase McQuerry’s freedom. All of us who operate within
imperfect, unjust, and even horrific institutions33 must grapple with the
and plentiful, where police did not control discipline, and where Black and brown students
could thrive. If this sounds modest, it was not. We were essentially operating on utopian
imagination in all of our work.
31. While my own conception of how transformational imagination operates largely
springs from my historical work and my practice, it is closely aligned with the way that Amna
Akbar describes the radical imagination that flows from movement spaces and into law reform
work. See generally Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U L.
REV. 405 (2018).
32. It should be said that I know this question to be a basic one. Just like the teenager
staring up into the stars contemplating their smallness knows themselves to be asking an
age-old question and still simultaneously has their mind blown—so too I experience asking
this question as both deeply unoriginal and yet personally vital. Indeed, it seems to me that
this is the sort of question that responsible actors must always be asking. When we treat
fundamental and existential questions as “asked and answered,” we lose track of the
importance of making the asking and answering an iterative process rather than a linear one.
33. Let me be clear that I am not drawing a direct moral equivalency here between the
horrific institutional structure of slavery and the legal academy! Obviously they are different,
and some might argue that their differences are so extreme that any comparison is specious.
My argument is simply that the struggle between purity and pragmatism is not only salient in
the most extreme cases, but rather a constant question for all who work within institutions that
they are critical of. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, it is a mistake to treat slavery and
the struggle for abolition as sui generis or a moral outlier. See Daniel Farbman, “An Outrage
Upon Our Feelings”: The Role of Local Governments in Resistance Movements, 42 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2097, 2171–74 (2021). Slavery was an entrenched legal, political, cultural, and
economic institution upheld through “normal” politics and struggled against with the tools of
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fraught balance between purity and pragmatism. Are we bound to the hard
consequences of purism? Or are there avenues within our institutional
infrastructure that allow us to pursue change with radical pragmatism?
This Essay is about the unsettled answer that I keep converging on: it may
be impossible to revolutionize the institutions we work in as insiders, but it
is possible for institutional actors to hold deliberative space within their
institutions for transformational and radical imagination. By deliberative, I
mean that the space be held open for conversation, democracy, and
participatory deliberation. None of us, alone, can imagine our way out of the
master’s house. But together, by stepping back and making space, we may
be able to open a commons34 in the master’s house, where we listen, dream,
and challenge each other. This commons could be a place where institutional
insiders are invited (or forced) to be in contact and in conversation with
voices and views not usually welcome or heard in the sealed spaces they
move in. When we open this destabilizing and democratic commons, we
may not be tearing down the master’s house, but we could be gaining the
means to transform it.
II. THREE EXAMPLES OF THE COMMONS
I am well aware that “holding deliberative space for radical imagination”
within institutions is an abstract idea in search of specific instances. In some
sense, the abstraction is the point. I have been converging on this aspiration
through my work for the last few years, but it is an aspiration more than a
prescription. The least I can do, however, is map out the convergence in the
hope that in doing so I can give some particularity to the idea.
The following three examples are drawn from my work on the history of
the institution of slavery and the struggle to tear that institution down.
Because slavery is such an archetype of an oppressive and unjust system, the
work of institutional actors within the systemic logics of slavery casts clear
shadows on our muddier institutional questions today. In these three
histories, I observed actors within institutional hierarchies—lawyers, judges,
local governments—wielding their power to open up a critical deliberative
space within the institutional structure from which foundational questions
about that structure could be asked. In doing so, each institutional actor
struggled to balance their assigned roles with radical critiques of the
structures on which those roles depended. Like the Cincinnati abolitionists,
“normal” politics. See id. In this sense, it is archetypal rather than atypical when we are
thinking about the institutions that we work within today. See id.
34. I recognize that “a commons” is an abstract term, and I invoke it in part because of
this abstraction. I expect that the term will resonate differently with different readers and
invoke different kinds of social and special imaginations. That’s good! Still, if it is useful, I
am drawn to the term in part because it invokes a space that is unowned and undominated but
existing within and among (and sometimes even inside) claims of land ownership and mastery.
The most explicit example of this was the “commons” system of open fields that existed in
Britain before enclosure (when all land was defined as pertaining to specific owners). See
generally Simon Fairlie, A Short History of Enclosure in Britain, LAND, Summer 2009, at 16,
19–20.
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these institutional actors also struggled to balance the immediate triage
demands of ending individual oppression with broader strategic movement
goals. From their collective radical pragmatism emerged a common
commitment to taking advantage of the space created by these struggles to
open doors into political and legal imaginaries that were not welcome within
the mainstream institutional framework.
In Resistance Lawyering, I focused on the work that lawyers did within the
despised procedural framework of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.35 The
power that these lawyers successfully wielded for their clients and against
the institution of slavery was rooted in the disruptive space they created in
courtrooms and within the legal system.
In “An Outrage Upon Our Feelings”: The Role of Local Governments in
Resistance Movements, my focus shifted to a group of cities and towns across
the North that passed resolutions condemning the Fugitive Slave Act.36 As
acts of local governments, these city and town resolutions were, literally,
institutional acts. I argued that these resolutions were most effective and
promising where they cast the public space of local government as a site of
resistance where deliberative democracy and radical imagination could
flourish.37
Finally, in my most recent paper, Judicial Solidarity?, I turn to the most
entrenched institutional actor in the legal system: the judge.38 I tell the story
of a judge named Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar and his 1854 grand jury
instruction in the wake of an armed uprising against the Fugitive Slave Act.39
In telling this story, I argue that even judges can seek to make space for
movements and radical imagination within the otherwise sealed spaces of
elite legal practice.40
While I draw the idea of a commons in the master’s house from these
examples, none of them offer a “model” or prescription in the sense that
lawyers and policy makers often desire. Rather, what is common to these
three examples is a shared outlook: humility, inclusion, and radical
pragmatism. The commons cannot be planned or built; rather, it is the space
that emerges when institutional insiders actively crack the windows and cede
space to make room for the voices speaking outside (and often against) the
institutional status quo.41 This is radical pragmatism because it does not seek
to manifest a utopian order on a broken world, but rather works in the cracks,
35. See generally Farbman, supra note 5.
36. See generally Farbman, supra note 33.
37. See id. at 2180–81.
38. See generally Farbman, supra note 18.
39. See id. at 28–49.
40. See id. at 49–54, 58–62.
41. Inside and outside are necessarily (and inherently) relative terms here. I am skeptical
that any of the outside voices that I am thinking about here could be considered truly outside
any institutional framework. All of us operate within our own frameworks, whether they be
nonprofit organizations or just the broader requirements of surviving in a capitalist society.
When I speak of “inside” and “outside,” then, I am referring to the specific institutional spaces
that legal insiders occupy (law schools, local governments, the courtroom) and the voices that
are generally not heard or welcomed in those spaces.
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lacunae, and corners of that broken world. Like every house, the master’s
house is drafty—there are gaps in the walls, leaks in the roof, unused dusty
corners. Those of us who live and work in that house can feverishly spackle,
seal, and vacuum—or we can make room for and nurture the disruptive
energies where we see them, thus making space for transformational
deliberation and radical imagination.
A. Resistance Lawyering
1. The History
By the fall of 1850, a rift had emerged in the socio-legal order of the United
States. On one hand, with every passing month, slavery was hardening its
grip in the South and in mainstream national law and politics. Across the
South, the laws regulating slavery were getting harsher as a new generation
of more radical hard-liners ascended to political power. Many states passed
laws cracking down on manumission,42 exiling (or enslaving) free Blacks,43
and banning abolitionist speech.44 These state hard-line policies were
reflected in national politics as well. By 1850, it had become the orthodox
view of legal and political elites that the compromise with slavery was a
foundational element of the constitutional order—and that if that
compromise was threatened, secession and Civil War would follow.45
Fueled by anxiety about the growth of antislavery politics, and with secession
and Civil War looming, the South and the allies of slavery extracted a series
of further compromises intended to guarantee the perpetuation of slavery.
From the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (which opened the Southwest up to
slavery), to the annexation of Texas, and then to the “compromise” of 1850,

42. See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619–1860, at
371–99 (1996) (analyzing the legal history surrounding manumission).
43. See generally ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE & ARIELA J. GROSS, BECOMING FREE,
BECOMING BLACK: RACE, FREEDOM, AND LAW IN CUBA, VIRGINIA, AND LOUISIANA 132–77
(2020) (reviewing the response to free people of color by those living in slave societies).
44. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress
Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835–37, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 785, 796–802 (1995)
(reviewing abolitionist efforts and subsequent attempts to silence them).
45. The most famous exponent of this compromise was Justice Joseph Story, who argued
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that the original Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was constitutional
because it embodied the Fugitive Slave Clause in the U.S. Constitution—which was a
compromise that was essential to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. 41 U.S. 539,
540–42 (1842). He wrote,
The full recognition of [the right to property in slaves] was indispensable to the
security of this species of property in all the slaveholding states; and indeed was so
vital to the preservation of their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be
doubted that it constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the
Union could not have been formed. Its true design was to guard against the doctrines
and principles prevailing in the non-slaveholding states, by preventing them from
intermeddling with or obstructing or abolishing the rights of the owners of slaves.
Id. at 540.
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a growing Southern brinksmanship sought to extract more assurances
supporting the future and security of slavery.46
This was the context in which the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was passed.
Southern legislators demanded new and stronger federal support for slave
owners seeking to reclaim their “property” when the human beings that they
had enslaved escaped to freedom.47 While the absolute numbers of fugitives
were low, Southerners saw the new law as a symbolically essential
commitment to their “‘sacred’ property rights.”48 Not only did “great
compromisers” like Daniel Webster accede to this demand, but they also
committed themselves to making good on the compromises’ guarantees and
to ensuring that alleged fugitives be effectively enslaved to prove the good
faith of the North.49
Behind legal institutionalists’ increasing adoption of (or capitulation to) a
hard-line defense of slavery was the growing salience of antislavery politics.
While abolition had been a part of mainstream political discourse since
before 1776, it was not until the mid-1830s that it began to grow into anything
more than a fringe movement.50 After 1836, however, fueled by growing
sectional tensions over westward expansion and effective antislavery
activism in the press and popular culture, the arguments against slavery had
become a force in national politics.51 From states passing “personal liberty
laws” to protect their Black citizens against kidnapping,52 to the controversy
over the annexation of Texas,53 to the splintering of the Whig party and the
birth of the Republican Party,54 antislavery arguments were driving electoral
and policy outcomes across the country.
And so, a dissonant gap opened between the growing antislavery
movement challenging the institutional foundations of slavery and the
increasingly reactionary mainstream legal and political defense of slavery.
While institutions, from Congress to political parties to the courts, doubled
down on their pledge of fealty to slavery, in clenching their fists they made
the institutions more brittle.
When the new Fugitive Slave Act was enacted in September 1850, the
law’s explicit goal was to strengthen federal support for slave owners seeking

46. For a detailed examination of these assurances, see 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE
ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY 1776–1854 (1990).
47. See Farbman, supra note 5, at 1893–94.
48. Id. at 1893. Slave owners and their political allies often talked about their right to
own human beings as “sacred” or “natural.” Among many to invoke the phrase “sacred rights
of property” was President James Buchanan in his final address to the U.S. Congress in 1860.
See H.R. JOURNAL, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1860).
49. See Farbman, supra note 5, at 1902–03.
50. See MANISHA SINHA, THE SLAVE’S CAUSE: A HISTORY OF ABOLITION 228 (2016).
51. See id.
52. See THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH 1780–1861, at ix (The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 4th prtg. 2008) (1974).
53. See SINHA, supra note 50, at 478–80.
54. See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY xiii–xv (2014).
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to “reclaim” and enslave humans that they claimed as property.55 The
procedural framework of the law was intended to soothe Southern hard-liners
in nearly every respect.56 It was very easy for putative owners to engage the
machinery of the law with federal marshals standing at the ready to
apprehend any alleged fugitive on nothing more than the owner’s word.57
Once apprehended, the process afforded by the law was explicitly biased
against the alleged fugitive. Alleged fugitives were not guaranteed lawyers,
had very little opportunity to present evidence, and could not have their cases
heard by a jury.58 The commissioners appointed to adjudicate the cases were
paid $10 if they found in favor of the putative owner, but only $5 if they
found in favor of the alleged fugitive.59 Perhaps most inflammatory for
Northerners, the new law increased criminal penalties for providing aid and
comfort to a fugitive in any way.60
To borrow a phrase, the new law’s cruelty was the point.61 Its procedural
framework was meant to appease hard-liners through its cramped injustices
and slanted summary process. As a result, the procedural legal framework
that came into existence was both harsh and brittle. For antislavery lawyers
contemplating practicing within this system, its cruelty made it apparent that
resistance was necessary.62 And yet, while some purists insisted that any
participation in the system validated and reified it,63 most rejected knee-jerk
purism and adopted a radically pragmatic approach to fighting against
slavery and against the Fugitive Slave Act.
In case after case, these lawyers used the new law’s paltry procedural tools
and all other tools at their disposal to disrupt, delay, and co-opt the law’s
process. This is the approach that I call “resistance lawyering” in my recent
article.64 There I described a resistance lawyer as someone who, by
practicing within a system that they believe to be unjust, “seeks both to
mitigate the worst injustices of that system and to resist, obstruct, and
dismantle the system itself.”65 While I argue that this model of lawyering

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Farbman, supra note 5, at 1893.
See generally id. at 1893–95.
See id. at 1894.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1894–95.
See generally ADAM SERWER, THE CRUELTY IS THE POINT: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF TRUMP’S AMERICA (2021).
62. Lawyers were among the thousands of people who protested against the law as soon
as it was signed. See generally Farbman, supra note 5, at 1895.
63. The most famous statement of this view came from Henry David Thoreau who,
excoriating lawyers and the legal system, argued that the only decent position that a lawyer or
a judge could take was to oppose the law and its operation entirely and exit the system. See
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Slavery in Massachusetts, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
HENRY DAVID THOREAU 695, 708 (Brooks Atkinson ed.1992). He wrote, “I am sorry to say
that I doubt there is a judge in Massachusetts who is prepared to resign his office and get his
living innocently.” Id.
64. Farbman, supra note 5, at 1880.
65. Id.
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transcends the 1850s, these abolitionist lawyers practicing within and against
the Fugitive Slave Act were archetypal examples of resistance lawyering.
Resistance Lawyering was a long article! I won’t rehash its arguments
here or redescribe the remarkable tactics of the abolitionist lawyers who
achieved amazing outcomes for their clients and for the movement more
broadly.66 Rather, I want to point out how these lawyers, acting as
institutional insiders within a legal procedural system, opened a commons
within the very most hostile institutional space. As noted earlier, the
framework of the Fugitive Slave Act was both harsh and brittle. To return
to the analogy of the master’s house, the walls were reinforced, but the joints
were not well sealed.
Through delay, procedural confusion, and strategic use of the press,67
antislavery lawyers invited subversive and radical imaginaries into
courtrooms designed to tamp down those voices. In a system designed to
ensure that alleged fugitives could not speak on their own behalf, lawyers
manipulated the rules so that they could speak.68 In a system designed to
minimize public outcry, lawyers magnified political salience and outrage in
every case they could.69 In a system designed to reinforce the compromise
with slavery, resistance lawyers transformed each case into a space to contest
and challenge that compromise.
2. Lawyers as Institutionalists
It is tempting to lionize abolitionist resistance lawyers and to figure them
as subversives and revolutionaries. I think this both overstates the case and
understates the power of the lessons they have to teach us today. There are
many lawyers today who stand in a similar oppositional (and yet embedded)
position with respect to the legal system that they practice within.70
Especially for public interest and nonprofit lawyers (who are
undercompensated financially), there is an understandable tendency to
compensate themselves with the self-righteousness of heroism. Indeed, since
the article was published, I have been struck by how many lawyers have
sought to claim the label “resistance lawyer” for themselves as a badge of
honor. As a former underpaid civil rights lawyer, I understand this impulse.
66. For those who are interested, I tell these stories in some detail in Part II of the article.
See id. at 1895–932.
67. See id. at 1905.
68. See, e.g., MARK REINHARDT, WHO SPEAKS FOR MARGARET GARNER? 25–26 (2010)
(describing how lawyer John Jolliffe, representing Margaret Garner—whose story inspired
Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved—managed to manipulate the trial process to allow Garner to
testify before the commissioner).
69. In case after case, lawyers used the bully pulpit of the courtroom to speak indirectly
to the press and build public support for the alleged fugitives they represented. See generally
Farbman, supra note 5, at 1905–32.
70. Here again, I acknowledge the huge differences between the context of slavery and
our present unjust frameworks, while insisting that the shadows of the past can be usefully
observed in the present. In the paper, I offer capital defense lawyers, public defenders, and
immigration lawyers as examples, though there are many others one could imagine as well.
See id. at 1939–52.
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Badges of radicalism, like proclamations of purity, are powerful rhetoric
against the ever-pulling tide of institutional complicity. Whether or not a
lawyer’s work fits within the definition I laid out, given the choice between
“resistance” and “status quo,” it is easy enough to guess which one most
cause lawyers would choose.
But while many lawyers are resistance lawyers in some sense, treating the
term as a heroic and individualistic badge misunderstands the lessons of the
1850s. The reality is both more prosaic and more powerful. Lawyers
working within institutions and struggling to make space to question and
upend those institutions are working in incremental but essential ways to
make a commons within the master’s house—not alone, but together with
each other and with the excluded voices whose imaginaries they invite into
that commons. Making this commons is resistance by inclusion and
invitation. It is resistance by making space for discourse and democracy. To
the extent that this is heroic work, it is heroism on a modest scale. And
modesty is a critical element: this model of resistance suggests that lawyers
are not the heroes of the movement, but rather coparticipants with the
activists, agitators, dreamers, and grassroots organizers who would be
excluded from the master’s house.
This modesty matters because no matter how radical a lawyer’s work and
critique, to be a lawyer is to be an institutionalist. Lawyers are, almost
definitionally, embedded as practitioners within a legal system. Living in the
real world, it hardly needs saying that all legal systems have a politics and
that many legal systems launder a complicity with oppressive structures
through the guise of neutrality. As I argue in Resistance Lawyering, there is
no one great structure that we can name “the legal system,” but rather
multiple and overlapping substantive and procedural frameworks that
lawyers practice within and around.71 Even if lawyers practice within
substructures and subsystems that they oppose, most lawyers retain a deeper
commitment to the “rule of law” and the abstract idea of a good and
functioning “legal system.”72
Casting lawyers as institutionalists should not minimize or dispirit.
Rather, it should highlight the extent to which lawyers cannot constructively
cast themselves as purists, wash their hands of “the system,” and propose to
burn it all down. Rather, as institutional insiders, their radicalism must be
pragmatic. Even for resistance lawyers with deep critiques of the systems
that they are operating within, it is not their work alone that is doing the work
of resistance.
The abolitionist lawyers that I wrote about were not dismantling slavery
on their own, and those that hoped to do so were deluded and ineffective.
Rather, they were vectors for bringing radical and transformative arguments
fueled by a transformative abolitionist imagination into legal spaces.
Through their obstructionist practices, grandstanding oratory, and procedural
shenanigans, these lawyers found ways to bring the force of outside
71. See id. at 1933–34.
72. See id.
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movement arguments into courtrooms, and then back out again into the
public view.
The radical and revolutionary energy that was driving antislavery politics
and resistance was an energy growing in movement spaces: Black
abolitionist vigilance committees, antislavery societies, churches, and
women’s sewing circles. The boundaries between those movement spaces
and the conventional and conservative spaces of law and legal argument were
policed by status quo legal elites. Paeans to “the rule of law” and demands
that laws like the Fugitive Slave Act be upheld to preserve “legal order” were
intended to do precisely what today’s demands that law not be “politicized”
are intended to do: erect a barrier between legal imaginaries and the
unsettling and threatening radical imaginaries developing in movement
spaces.
What resistance lawyers did and continue to do is to breach that barrier.
By making space for movement actors to speak and by muddying the
boundaries between legal and movement imaginaries, lawyers can open up a
deliberative space within the very institutions that they operate within.
Framed this way, resistance lawyers both past and present do not need to
choose purity or complicity. They need not choose whether to take up or
reject the “master’s tools.” Instead, through modesty, strategy, and radical
pragmatism, they can make space within the master’s house for critique,
imagination, and transformation.
B. Outraged Towns
Lawyers were not the only institutionalists outraged by the Fugitive Slave
Act. When the law was signed by President Millard Fillmore in 1850, a wave
of outrage manifested in spontaneous community gatherings and meetings
across the increasingly antislavery North.73 Most of the antislavery societies
and vigilance committees that convened these meetings operated outside of
government.74 The mass movement against the law was burning from the
grassroots against the brittle but rigid institutions that upheld slavery.
Apart from the small, but growing, cadre of antislavery politicians at the
state and national levels, most public officials and government actors either
stayed aloof from the abolitionist firestorm or, like Daniel Webster, pledged
fealty to the new law and the “patriotic” project of compromise.75
Nevertheless, a small number of towns and cities sought to get off the
sidelines by passing resolutions that condemned the Fugitive Slave Act and
promised to nullify it.
I wrote about these local resolutions in my recent article, “An Outrage
Upon Our Feelings”: The Role of Local Governments in Resistance
Movements.76 In that article, I collect examples of local resolutions from
73. See Farbman, supra note 33, at 2125.
74. Today we would likely see them as nonprofits or nongovernment organizations, but
those labels did not carry their present meaning in the 1850s.
75. See Farbman, supra note 33, at 2167–69.
76. See generally id. at 2122–63.
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cities and towns across the North.77 The language in these resolutions was
strident. Acton, Massachusetts, called the law “an abomination without a
parallel in the annals of our government.”78 The citizens of Marshfield,
Massachusetts—the hometown of hero-turned-villain Daniel Webster—
called the law a “disgrace to the civilization of the age, and clearly at variance
with the whole spirit of the Christian faith.”79 Not only was the law a moral
outrage, they argued, but it was unconstitutional.80
For the local governments that felt and spoke this way, it was clear that
they sought to resist the Fugitive Slave Act. The central strategic question
was then: what could be done to stop the law? The short answer common to
every resisting town was, dispiritingly, almost nothing. In some places, like
Acton or Marshfield, there were very few Black residents and very little
chance that an alleged fugitive slave would ever be apprehended in town.81
In small and predominantly white towns, the outrage of the new law was a
political abstraction. It was easy to promise to resist or even nullify the law
because there was almost no chance that anyone would be forced to keep that
promise in any substantial way.
In other places, like Chicago, there were many more free Black residents
and thus a much higher likelihood that a slave owner would leverage the
law’s mechanisms to reclaim their “property” within the city.82 For a city
like Chicago, the question of local capacity for resistance was much more
pragmatic. The city could choose to deploy its police or constabulary to
intervene against the federal marshals and protect an alleged fugitive.
Moreover, the city could choose to use its resources in other material ways
to provide physical sanctuary and protection for alleged fugitives. For
pragmatic reasons, however, no city ever proposed to take such steps.
Interposing local police against federal marshals was a recipe for armed civil
conflict, which the city would almost certainly lose. Perhaps more to the
point, although there was value in expressing antislavery outrage, there was
less reason for the city government to take the much more substantial risk of
challenging the federal government on behalf of residents who were not
full-fledged citizens.
Whatever the reasons, despite often high-flying rhetoric and saber-rattling
about nullifying the law, no local government actually took any meaningful
77. Although, truth be told, the vast majority of the examples wind up being from small
towns in Massachusetts, with Chicago being an important outlier. See generally id.
78. Id. at 2157 (quoting Resolutions at 1851 Acton Town Meeting in Response to
Federal Fugitive Slave Act, ACTON MEM’L LIBR. CIV. WAR ARCHIVES,
https://www.actonmemoriallibrary.org/civilwar/documents/acton_town_meeting/1851_resol
utions.html [https://perma.cc/VLD9-SR6X] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022)).
79. Id. at 2100 (quoting 1 LYSANDER SALMON RICHARDS, HISTORY OF MARSHFIELD 163
(1901)).
80. In Weymouth, Massachusetts, the resolutions proclaimed the law “‘highly obnoxious
to the people of this Town’ because it was ‘unconstitutional’ as well as ‘arbitrary, unjust, and
cruel.’” Id. at 2130 (quoting Proceedings of the Weymouth Town Meeting of November 12,
1850, in RECORDS OF THE TOWN OF WEYMOUTH).
81. See id. at 2127, 2142.
82. See id. at 2134–35.
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substantive action to resist the law. While private citizens organized to patrol
the streets and alert residents to the threat of slave catchers,83 local
governments did not help with these efforts.84 While private citizens
denounced anyone who would collaborate with the slave catchers, local
governments were unwilling to back their rhetoric with real sanctions against
their collaborating neighbors.85
Where the gap between rhetoric and action was so stark, it is tempting to
conclude that local governments were simply not rich or effective sites for
resistance. Put more sharply, a close examination of many of these
resolutions points toward a shallow and ineffective performative alignment
with the abolitionist movement. To speak against an outrage is better than
nothing! But empty institutional promises feel more like bluster than
support.
It is not hard to translate the bleak picture from the past into today’s
landscape. In my recent article, I note the many parallels between the 1850
resolutions and contemporary sanctuary resolutions.86 The politics around
proclaiming sanctuary are problematically familiar, and many cities and
towns have performatively embraced the idea of sanctuary as “good politics”
without doing as much as they could (or should) to actually protect their
residents against being detained and deported.87
It is tempting, then, to drift toward purism—to the view that the only place
where “true” resistance can happen is on the outside of the formal structures
of governance. It is tempting to conclude that local governments can, at best,
be sympathetic windbags and, at worst, make cynical promises that they will
not live up to. In short, looking at the present through the past, there is reason
to be concerned that governmental actors cannot be productive participants
in resistance movements.

83. In Chicago, a group of abolitionists gathered at Quinn Chapel A.M.E. Church (a
predominantly Black church) to create a well-articulated plan for private patrols. Id. at 2135.
The meeting was explicit about how much help they expected from the government: “[W]e
must abandon the hope of any protection from [the] government.” Id. (second alteration in
original) (quoting 1 CHRISTOPHER ROBERT REED, BLACK CHICAGO’S FIRST CENTURY: 1833–
1900, at 101 (2005)).
84. See id. at 2161.
85. In Weymouth, Massachusetts, for example, the resolutions labeled “any man who
oficially or unoficially shall aid or abet the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law” as “a deadly
enemy to the virtue[,] peace[, and] security” of the town. Proceedings of the Weymouth Town
Meeting of November 12, 1850, in RECORDS OF THE TOWN OF WEYMOUTH; see also Farbman,
supra note 33, at 2129–30. Having said that, however, the town meeting failed to impose any
available sanctions, such as revoking town licenses or expulsion from the town meeting. See
id. at 2130.
86. See generally Farbman, supra note 33, at 2169–81.
87. The example of Chicago is relevant again here. In 2016 after the election of former
President Donald Trump, Mayor Rahm Emmanuel promised undocumented residents of the
city that they would be “safe in Chicago.” Alex Kotlowitz, The Limits of Sanctuary Cities,
NEW YORKER (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-limits-ofsanctuary-cities [https://perma.cc/4E9C-C3UF]; see also Farbman, supra note 33, at 2175
n.242. In the first six months after the election, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
deported nearly 3,000 Chicagoans. Id. at 2177.
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For all the sympathy I have with this temptation, I want to push back
against it. My argument in the article begins with the flickering promise of
the resolutions passed by the town meeting in Acton, Massachusetts, in the
spring of 1851.88 Like many of its neighboring towns that spoke out, Acton’s
resolutions condemned the Fugitive Slave Act in no uncertain terms. 89 They
called the law a capitulation to slavery and slave owners and called the law
“manifestly iniquitous and unconstitutional.”90 But unlike its neighbors,
Acton’s resolutions neither promised to nullify the law nor to provide
sanctuary.91 Rather, Acton’s resolutions made explicit that the purpose of
speaking was not to pretend substantive protection, but rather to keep faith
with the town’s tradition of civic engagement and virtue.92 In keeping faith
with the town’s moral traditions, Acton was doing more than virtue signaling.
The resolutions make it clear that the town was pledging to hold civic space
for resistance to the law. Without promising to resist the law by public
means, the resolutions promised to value civil disobedience against the law
and to support and foster a space for town residents to organize against the
law.93
Acton’s resolutions modeled the promise of radical pragmatism in local
resistance. Acton did not cast itself as the hero or protector.94 The town
meeting seemed aware of the limits of its own capacity to resist the law.95
But the resolutions also implicitly recognized that the institution of local
government represents a civic space.96 Acton’s resolutions thus invited civil
resisters, abolitionists, organizers, and radical imaginations into the civic
space of the town.97 In this sense, Acton transformed its town common into
a commons within the master’s house.98
Acton’s example from 1851 points the way toward a model for today’s
local governments. Just as resistance lawyers decenter themselves to create
space within the institutions of legal practice, so too can local governments
decenter their own role to create civic space for movement energies to flow
in and through. Once again, the model is radical pragmatism. Where
institutionalists within local governments (including the political arms of
88. See generally Farbman, supra note 33, at 2104, 2155–60.
89. See id. at 2155.
90. Id. at 2156 (quoting Resolutions at 1851 Acton Town Meeting in Response to Federal
Fugitive Slave Act, supra note 78).
91. See id.
92. The resolutions declare that the town meeting “feel it to be a duty we owe to the
memory of our Fathers that we owe ourselves, to our descendants, to our Country and to our
God, to record our solemn protest against said law.” Id. at 2157 (quoting Resolutions at 1851
Acton Town Meeting in Response to Federal Fugitive Slave Act, supra note 78).
93. See id. at 2158.
94. See id. at 2159.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See generally id.
98. The Acton Town Common is a painfully iconic representative of the New England
stereotype. There is a green (with a war memorial at its center) laid out in front of the old
congregational church. See Acton, FREEDOM’S WAY, https://freedomsway.org/
communities/acton/ [https://perma.cc/6V58-WFBU] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
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those governments themselves) are drawn toward helping resistance
movements, they can act strategically and incrementally. Broad public
statements of sanctuary may be helpful, but so too may be small gestures like
participatory budgeting, extending the franchise to noncitizens, and making
room for radical imagination within and across the wide array of local public
space.
If the argument here is somewhat dyspeptic about the value of public
proclamations of sanctuary or high-flying local political rhetoric, it is
ultimately optimistic on the question of whether and how local governments
can participate in resistance movements. If movements require nourishment
and democratic space to thrive, local governments can be powerful
incubators of transformative ideas and energies. Not only is this a hopeful
image, it is already happening to a greater and lesser extent all over the
country and the world.99 Recognizing these already flourishing commons
within our existing institutions promises to shift focus away from
antigovernment purism and toward growing, extending, and maximizing
these spaces.
C. Resisting Judges
The optimistic spark that I am trying to protect from the elements relies on
the observation that, to varying degrees, institutional actors have made, and
can make, space within otherwise hostile institutions to nourish and support
resistance movements. But against that optimism blows a large objection.
Even if the kind of radical pragmatism that I am identifying is possible, it is
also rare. It is far more common for institutional insiders to act to exclude
radical imaginaries and close down the space for resistance movements to
flourish.
This was true in the 1850s, and it remains true today. Perhaps the most
well-known study of this bleak story is Robert Cover’s book Justice Accused:
Antislavery and the Judicial Process.100 In the book, Cover canvassed the
way that the legal elite—especially judges—coalesced around the view that
the survival of the union depended on maintaining the compromise with
slavery.101 In particular, Cover focused on antislavery judges.102 As judges,
these men (and they were all men) were the central pillars of the legal
establishment, and in Cover’s telling, every one of them chose complicity
99. One prominent example of this idea is the municipalist movement. Muncipalists have
identified local government as a site for their work of “radicaliz[ing] democracy, feminiz[ing]
politics and driv[ing] the transition to an economy that cares for people and our environment.”
See About, FEARLESS CITIES, https://www.fearlesscities.com/en/about [https://perma.cc/TS4J4JUT] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022). The most prominent working example of municipalism in
action is Barcelona, but there are municipalist movements and governments all over the world.
See Map, FEARLESS CITIES, https://www.fearlesscities.com/en/map [https://perma.cc/SA5LSUFS] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
100. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975).
101. See generally id.
102. See generally id.
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with slavery over their personal moral objections against it.103 This was what
Cover called “the moral-formal dilemma.”104 While Cover began his
analysis disgusted at these craven judges, he ultimately concluded that
lawyers and judges, as deeply entangled as they were with the institutions
that they operated within, were simply not well-suited to be the agents of
change within those institutions.105 In his evocative framing, judges were
priests, not prophets.106
Robert Cover’s view of judges and the limited scope of their capacity to
be useful in resistance movements stands not only as the definitive statement
on the subject for the 1850s, but also for today. In my recent paper, Judicial
Solidarity?, I call Cover’s view “judicial dismalism” and argue that it is
aligned with a form of purism that comes straight from Henry David
Thoreau.107 Thoreau, in his seminal essay Civil Disobedience, argues that
where a judge is faced with an unjust law, his only option is to refuse to
enforce that law and resign.108 Both Thoreau and Cover share the view that
judges either cannot or will not do anything from within their institutional
role to disrupt or challenge that institution.109 To merge their views, prophets
resign while priests labor on.
In Judicial Solidarity?, I confront the Cover/Thoreau purist view and,
through the story of Thoreau’s neighbor, Judge Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar,
unsettle the stability of their conclusion.110 Judge Hoar, a native of Concord,
Massachusetts, was deeply entwined personally and intellectually with his
famous transcendentalist neighbors Emerson and Thoreau.111 Hoar’s parents
were Yankee royalty (his father was known as “Squire Hoar” and his mother
was the daughter of Roger Sherman).112 Like so many other Massachusetts
elites, Hoar had been educated at Harvard and raised in staunchly orthodox
traditional politics.113 In short, he was no firebrand. But Hoar was also a
leader of the increasingly mainstream antislavery political movement in
Massachusetts.114 As an elite antislavery institutionalist, Hoar fit Cover’s

103. See generally id. See also Farbman, supra note 18, at 13–14, 57–58.
104. COVER, supra note 100, at 5; see also Farbman, supra note 18, at 57.
105. See generally COVER, supra note 100.
106. See id. at 259 (“If a man makes a good priest, we may be quite sure that he will not be
a great prophet.”).
107. See Farbman, supra note 18, at 12.
108. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 665, 680 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1992).
109. See generally Farbman, supra note 18, at 57–58.
110. See generally id. at 5–8.
111. See id. at 28, 37–38. Hoar’s sister had been engaged to marry Emerson’s younger
brother Charles before he tragically died, and Ralph Waldo Emerson had taken her into his
household. See id. at 36. Hoar’s younger brother was Thoreau’s close friend and frequent
walking companion. See id. at 37.
112. See id. at 28–29.
113. See id. at 29–30.
114. While Hoar was no fire-breather, he was a staunch opponent of slavery when he served
in the state legislature. See generally id. at 34–36. He was among the first and founding
members of the Massachusetts Republican Party that emerged as an antislavery party from the
ashes of the Whig Party. See id.
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profile perfectly. He was precisely the kind of judge who would oppose
slavery in private but uphold its institutional compromises in public in the
name of political and social stability.
Hoar was not the only antislavery judge to charge a grand jury on how the
law should treat abolitionists who resisted the Fugitive Slave Act. In Judicial
Solidarity?, I collect and digest all the other grand jury instructions delivered
in cases prosecuting abolitionists who tried to rescue or otherwise help
alleged fugitives.115 Every other judge, no matter where they sat or what
their attitude toward slavery was, had the same response to these cases: the
Fugitive Slave Act must be enforced, and resistance to the law must be
punished because otherwise the rule of law would disintegrate.116 These jury
instructions, as a collection, strongly confirm Cover’s dismal view of
antislavery judges. To a man, the priests of the legal institution doubled
down on institutionalism and sought to choke off any challenges to the status
quo and the legal order.
Judge Hoar’s jury instruction was different. Where every other judge took
pains to establish the legitimacy and enforceability of the Fugitive Slave Act,
Judge Hoar proclaimed that the law “seems to me to evince a more deliberate
and settled disregard of all the principles of constitutional liberty than any
other enactment which has ever come under my notice.”117 Where every
other judge argued that the law’s legitimacy must be stable, Hoar (while
acknowledging that the law was currently constitutional) argued that the
law’s legitimacy is dynamic and could be changed through mass politics.118
And where every other judge feared that any resistance to the law in the name
of “higher law” would be the gateway to secession and anarchy,119 Hoar
explicitly allowed for the moral possibility of civil resistance. He allowed
that when a man “acting conscientiously and uprightly, believes [a law] to be
wicked, and which, acting under the law of God, he thinks he ought to
disobey, unquestionably he ought to disobey that statute.”120
In the context of the other jury instructions, and in the shadow of Cover’s
dismal view, Judge Hoar’s instruction stands out. Again and again, Hoar
rejects the institutional orthodoxy that would clamp down on dissent and
affirm the legal order. Again and again, Hoar makes space for the radical
abolitionist ideas swirling outside his courtroom door. One could dispute
(and I discuss this dispute at length in the article) whether Hoar’s instruction
does enough to truly stand in solidarity with the movement to abolish slavery.
One could argue (as Thoreau did)121 that it would have been better for him
to resign than to continue to operate within a corrupted system.
115. See id. at 16–24.
116. See id.
117. EBENEZER ROCKWOOD HOAR, CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY, AT THE JULY TERM OF THE
MUNICIPAL COURT, IN BOSTON, 1854, at 7 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1854); see also
Farbman, supra note 18, at 44.
118. See Farbman, supra note 18, at 43.
119. See generally id. at 16–24.
120. HOAR, supra note 117, at 8 (emphasis added); see also Farbman, supra note 18, at 47.
121. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, these strategic arguments are beside the point. The question is
not whether or not Judge Hoar was a “hero of the resistance.”™ As I
previously argued, this very idea is itself a distraction. Instead, what interests
me is the attempt. In Judge Hoar’s deviant grand jury instruction, I see
another effort by someone who holds institutional power to make space for
deliberation, resistance, and radical imagination within a hostile system. It
may be that, in Cover’s terms, Hoar is a priest and not a prophet. But he is a
priest who wants to make room for prophecy rather than one who wants to
stamp it out. Or, to bring the metaphor back around, Hoar is yet another
master who is working to open up a destabilizing and democratizing
commons within the master’s house.
Transposing Hoar’s story to the present, we face the modern application
of Cover’s challenge. Can judges be allies in struggles for liberation and in
movements resisting unjust institutions? One could argue that the question
itself is destabilizing. The concepts of judicial remove and neutrality are
baked so deeply into our legal system that the ideas (and self-evident facts)
of judicial politics and moral motivation are taboo.122 To suggest that judges
can or should make room for the challenges of movement politics within their
courtrooms is a fundamental breach of this decorum. The trouble, however,
is that the breach is inevitable. It does not take an expert to see how deeply
the political environment outside the courtroom walls inflects the
decision-making of the judges within. As was true in the 1850s, judges can
either work actively to exclude the deliberative and radical clamor of
movement politics from legal spaces or, like Judge Hoar, they can make
space for that clamor within the system.
Neither of these two options is “neutral” or “impartial.” Both are taken
with the clamor within earshot. The question today, as in the past, is what
judges and other institutionalists do in the context of that clamor. Modest as

122. It would be almost silly to generate a string-cite here to encapsulate the broad struggle
being waged in academia, in the courts, and in our politics. Instead, let me offer just two
prominent examples, both from the highest priests of the judiciary: Justice Breyer and Chief
Justice Roberts. Justice Breyer has argued repeatedly against the view that judicial decisions
are driven by politics instead of legal principles, which he believes is inaccurate and erodes
the public’s trust in the U.S. Supreme Court. See Harvard Law School, Scalia Lecture: Justice
Stephen G. Breyer, “The Authority of the Court and the Peril of Politics,” YOUTUBE (Apr. 7,
2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHxTQxDVTdU [https://perma.cc/J4LX-DHZR].
His view, apparently sincerely held, is rooted in a deep orthodoxy within the legal profession,
which insists that judicial impartiality is a necessary virtue for the ongoing health of the legal
order. Chief Justice Roberts agrees. In his (in)famous testimony during his nomination
hearings, he insisted that the role of a judge was simply to “call balls and strikes.”
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“I come before the Committee with no agenda. I have no
platform. Judges are not politicians who can promise to do certain things in exchange for
votes. I have no agenda, but I do have a commitment. If I am confirmed, I will confront every
case with an open mind. I will fully and fairly analyze the legal arguments that are presented.
I will be open to the considered views of my colleagues on the bench, and I will decide every
case based on the record, according to the rule of law, without fear or favor, to the best of my
ability, and I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”).

2022]

A COMMONS IN THE MASTER’S HOUSE

2083

it is, Hoar’s model shows how a judge might make a less dismal choice than
simply stopping up their ears and screaming for peace.
III. MAKING THE COMMONS
A. Against Prescription
One of the risks of rooting historical examples in the movement to abolish
slavery is that it feeds the temptation to lionize the resisters in these stories.
There are few moments in history where “right” and “wrong” seem so starkly
defined from our modern vantage point than the 1850s in the United States.
Along with the temptation toward lionizing resisters comes a temptation to
draw prescriptive lessons from them. It is tempting, in short, to argue that
these heroes strove to make a commons in the master’s house and that we
should follow their blueprint.
As tempting as this takeaway is, I want to reject it. I reject it for two
reasons that are worth rehearsing here as I close. First, the very idea that
there are heroes, or that institutional actors can be heroes, is
counterproductive. To the extent that there is a utopian promise of making a
commons within our unjust institutions, it is a collective project that requires
stepping back and ceding space rather than stepping up and taking credit.
Second, the search for a prescriptive blueprint is a distraction. Even if it
were not true that the 1850s was a fundamentally different political, cultural,
and legal context than today, what is common to each of these stories is not
substantive strategy, but rather a radical pragmatism that rejects grand plans
and adopts contingency and specificity. What it meant for institutionalists to
make space and cede power was entirely contingent on their relationships to
organizers, movements, and radical imagination. What the examples in these
stories have in common is an aspiration toward, rather than a plan for,
opening space.
The difference between aspiration and planning may seem abstract, but it
is critical. One of the things that makes lawyers so prone toward
institutionalism is the way that legal training emphasizes planning. Law
students and young lawyers are taught to brief cases, outline classes, map out
pleadings, and script out depositions. They are professionalized into the logic
of law school and the legal profession in its hierarchy123 (and in its
maleness124 and whiteness125). All these strategies are about creating and
preserving order. For example, the very act of outlining a class in preparation
for a final exam is predicated on the hope that there is rationalized order that
the student can impose on the class. That order, properly imposed, creates
the possibility of planning for (and succeeding on) a final exam that tests
synthetic comprehension. Students become the heroes of their own quest to

123. See generally Kennedy, supra note 24.
124. See generally LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE & JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN:
WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997).
125. See generally Capers, supra note 27.
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impose effective order on the universe and then have their heroism crowned
with the laurels of the professor’s evaluation.126
Where the goal is success within the guidelines of an established
institutional framework (grades in law school), this makes perfect sense. But
it should also be clear that it reifies the institution itself. Where the institution
rewards the heroes who vanquish their exams, those who get those rewards
walk away with more power within the institutions as their spoils. Thus, the
ideas of heroism and institutionalism are intertwined and self-reinforcing.
Heroism exists only in the context of the institutions—the sword that the law
student uses to vanquish exams cannot be used to vanquish the idea of exams
altogether. In other words, to deploy the central metaphor of this Essay in a
different context, no matter how carefully sharpened or expertly wielded, the
master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.
Opening a commons within the master’s house, then, must mean
something other than planning and heroic striving. What all of the stories
that I summarize here share are people with institutional power aspiring
toward destabilizing the very institutions that gave them power. What the
abolitionist judges, the town meeting of Acton, and Judge Hoar all
understood was that the real power to destabilize came from outside (or at
least beyond) the relatively narrow confines of their specific institutional
context. The goal was not to tame and translate those forces into a litigation
strategy or a closing argument. Rather, the goal was to let the forces in, in
all of their chaos, complexity, and radical potential.
All these stories show that the acts of letting in, making space, and stepping
back are opportunistic rather than premeditated. I have called the process
“radical pragmatism.” It requires the institutional actors to be in active and
integrated relationships with movement actors and to seize the opportunities
to open a commons when they appear at the cracks and joints of their
institutional practice. This means humility. But it also means more than that.
It means a thoughtful and self-reflective practice of space making.
And since this Essay is partly written in the key of autobiography, let me
say that what I describe here is a practice that I aspire to in my own work
both on the page (here) and in the classroom. Although I am identifying this
strain of thought and practice in my own work, I am far from the only lawyer
or academic working on these ideas.127 I am, myself, no “hero of the

126. Though, of course, grades are not strictly speaking evaluations so much as they are an
exercise in ranking to fill the insatiable appetite of the curve. The fact that the laurels come
from comparison and competition only emphasizes the extent to which students are the heroes
of their own saga.
127. Generating anything like a full list of citations here would almost certainly exclude by
omission more than it would include. Suffice it to say that the work I am identifying myself
with here is work claimed by lawyers who call themselves movement lawyers, community
lawyers, organizers, radicals, cause lawyers, and more. It is work that is undertaken every day
in law school clinics and law school classrooms. To cite just a few personal lodestars:
GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW
PRACTICE (1992); Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law,
73 STAN. L. REV. 821 (2021); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
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resistance,” but I do believe that law schools and the legal academy are
institutional contexts where space making is both essential and able to make
change.
I say this because I have seen it. I am writing these words just weeks after
one of my most influential mentors, Lani Guinier, passed away. I took
Professor Guinier’s class “The Responsibilities of Public Lawyers” when I
was a first-year student at law school. Two years later, I was lucky to be a
teaching fellow for the class when she taught it again. Like many students
who came to law school hoping to change the world, I had found the reality
of legal education to be dispiriting and obfuscating. I had found my own
capacity for imagination to be dulled by complexity and confusion. But when
I stepped into Professor Guinier’s class in the spring of my first year, it was
like I felt the breeze on my cheeks for the first time in months. There, in the
heart of the master’s house of Harvard Law School, Professor Guinier was
modeling the practice of stepping back and challenging us, as students, not
only to step up, but to make space for voices and imaginations beyond
ourselves and beyond our law school context to be present in our
conversations.
Professor Guinier was not perfect, and neither was the class. We did not
escape the hierarchy of our surroundings or bring about radical
transformations on the spot. But I will never forget the optimism that I felt
in the first week of class as I started to see the promise of the practice of
radical pragmatism in my legal education. This is the promise that I realize
animates my writing and my teaching. It is an optimism that lives not in a
prescription for how we should teach, but rather in a reminder that when we
step back, cede space, crack the windows and relinquish control, we let in the
breezes and voices that can change the spaces we inhabit from within.
B. In Defense of Where We Are
I can trace how my own path of inquiry has traveled from Professor
Guinier’s classroom, to my time in practice, to research that I have committed
my last five years to. But I can also see how my nonprescriptive prescription
to “make space” and practice radical pragmatism might be frustrating. At the
nub of each story that I have told is a kernel of optimism—that struggle
against oppressive institutions may not be in vain. But if I refuse to tell you
how to struggle (you’ll know it when you see it) or that the struggle is heroic
(you win when you recede), it all can feel more like an aphorism or a koan
than a law review article. Fair enough. So let me close with something more
like concrete optimism.
I presume that almost everyone reading this Essay is an institutionalist of
some stripe. If you are a law student, you already hold a great deal of
privilege and power and are being trained to wield and reify the power of the
legal order as part of your professional identity. If you are a law professor,
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Lani
Guinier, Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008).
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despite your grumbling, your power and institutional complicity are all the
more deeply inscribed. If you are a lawyer, politician, teacher, etc., I can tell
similar stories. Few of us (and perhaps none of us), as individuals, are truly
outsiders.
Given this reality, the great danger that purism poses is a corresponding
fatalism. If we believe that the master’s tools will never dismantle the
master’s house, but all we have are the master’s tools, then we are forced to
conclude that we will never dismantle the house. This fatalism itself need
not be crippling for the existentialists among us,128 but it will be dispiriting
to many. As a general matter, it leaves institutionalists with three choices:
The first is to follow Thoreau and reject the institutions altogether and
become a purist agitator for external change. The second is to follow Cover’s
judges and reject the hope of change altogether and become an avowed
defender of the institution. The third is to reject fatalism.
The most common way that lawyers tend to reject fatalism is to reject
Lorde’s warning altogether. The argument goes: lawyers have been heroes
in the story of making fundamental change. With the right litigation strategy
or the right degree of leverage, this view suggests, lawyers can change the
world. This view is a version of the hero’s journey that I am skeptical of.
Doubtless, lawyers do a great deal of good for their clients within the existing
institutions that they inhabit. Much of that good might rightly be called
heroic—from keeping clients alive in the face of the death penalty to keeping
clients in homes in the face of eviction. But the conventional heroism here
is within the framework of the “system” not struggling to transform it. Thus,
this pathway is less a rejection of fatalism than an avoidance.
But I think it is possible for insiders to reject fatalism in a more effective
way without renouncing the institutions themselves. In the stories I have told
in my articles and that I summarize here, radical pragmatists balance the
individual heroism of their practice within the system with a broader
opportunistic struggle against the oppressions of those institutions. They
decenter their own heroic narratives within the logics of the system and make
space for other voices, other stories, and other imaginations to mingle in the
commons.
What radical pragmatism and the commons look like will be different in
different institutional contexts. I have said a good deal about what this may
mean for lawyers, judges, and public officials, but it is worth locating the
practice specifically in the space that may be closest to home for many who
read it: law school and legal education. Those of us who teach in law schools
hold the keys to the discursive spaces in our classrooms. While there is much
about the institutional realities of legal education that we cannot change,
128. The particular existentialist that I am thinking of here is Derrick Bell. While Bell
famously came to the conclusion that racism is permanent, he refused to let its permanence be
a cause to stop striving. His conclusion, he argued, was not “cause for either despair or
surrender. Rather, these dire prognostications pose a challenge and a basis for lifetime
commitment to fight against the racism that diminishes the lives of its supporters as well as its
victims.” Derrick Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or
Unconscious Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 572 (1993).
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there are a thousand ways that we have the power to open classroom spaces
and disrupt their hierarchies and rigidities. Those of us who write scholarship
similarly have a great deal of agency in what we write and who we write
for129 (even if we write within a framework of scholarly pressures that we
don’t control). And those of you who are law students do so much work to
hold the institutional space of legal education. There are countless
opportunities to make space and open windows from within the classroom,
in making editorial decisions on journals,130 and in student organizing.
It is critically important to say that not all of us who are situated within
institutions believe those institutions need to be changed. But for those of us
who do, we are not faced with the stark choice between complicity and
purism. Rather, we—lawyers, law students, law professors, institutionalists
of all stripes—have the power to invest in radical imaginaries and movement
pressures and to opportunistically make space within our institutional
practices for those imaginaries and pressures to operate from the inside.
Through the specific transformative work of self-awareness and engagement,
we can, together, open a commons in the master’s house.

129. Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar, and Jocelyn Simonson have recently argued “that legal
scholars should take seriously the epistemological universe of today’s left social movements,
their imaginations, experiments, tactics, and strategies for legal and social change.” Akbar,
Ashar, & Simonson, supra note 127, at 825.
130. Here, again, I speak from autobiography. One of the moments in my own life within
the institutional framework of law school that I found most optimistic was my experience as
part of a team of editors that worked on an article published in the Harvard Civil Rights–Civil
Liberties Law Review (CRCL) by a man named Thomas O’Bryant. See Thomas C. O’Bryant,
The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299 (2006). O’Bryant was (and
remains) imprisoned in Florida on a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. When I
was a student editor at CRCL, we received a submission from O’Bryant telling his story and
critiquing the byzantine rules of habeas under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996. Over the course of a year, I worked as part of a team of editors to bring
O’Bryant’s handwritten article into the formal pages of a law review—and thus into the view
of a set of readers who would not have otherwise encountered it. On one level, it was small
work—one law review article (maybe 100,000 law review articles) will not change the world.
On the other hand, it was transformational work for me, my coeditors, and O’Bryant. We
were occupying a formal and well-understood institutional space publishing scholarship in a
well-respected journal. By opening space for a different and otherwise excluded voice, we let
a new breeze blow through the still air of our journal office. For more about the publication
of the article and the journal’s process, see Jocelyn Simonson, Breaking the Silence: Legal
Scholarship as Social Change, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2006). It is the author’s great
risk that telling personal stories tends toward a heroic account from the first person. That is
not what I intend! Rather, I mean this story as an illustration of what kind of work I am talking
about, tuned, inevitably, in the key of my own experience.

